Contributors
Pseudonymous by design. Verifiable by default.
BLINDSATS is developed by a pseudonymous group of contributors with backgrounds across Bitcoin, cryptography, blockchain infrastructure and open-source software.
Some contributors remain active elsewhere in the broader blockchain ecosystem. To avoid conflicts with existing professional commitments and to preserve the privacy principles behind the protocol, contributors do not publish their legal identities.
Contributor identity is not a substitute for checking the implementation and its trust assumptions. The current protocol still depends on the authenticated initial allocation and operator-issued route tickets for new operations.
The current implementation whitepaper distinguishes deployed behavior from historical designs. Its authoritative text is in English, as is this page.
According to the project team, external independent reviews are in progress; the reported organizations and scope are listed in the project-reported audit status. No completed audit report is published. This status is not a claim of certification or institutional endorsement.
Lineage
- 1982ChaumSign without seeing. [1]
- 2011Blind BitcoinBreak the link between deposit and withdrawal. [2]
- 2014Dryer21Revisit anonymous Bitcoin with blind signatures. [3]
- 2016ZcashVerify value without revealing ownership. [4][5]Zerocash (2014) goes live.
- 2021TaprootA new programmable commitment layer for Bitcoin. [6]
- TodayBlindBitcoin stays public. Ownership doesn't have to.
Research lineage and implementation
The following work provides historical context for private electronic cash, commitments and Bitcoin-based verification. It is not a list of features already implemented by BLINDSATS, nor a claim that the authors have reviewed or endorsed this project. The current wire formats, proof systems and dependencies are described in the implementation whitepaper.
| Year | Research | Relation to the current implementation |
|---|---|---|
| 1982 | Blind signatures (Chaum) [1]. | Historical motivation for privacy-preserving electronic cash. The current note system uses zero-knowledge proofs; it does not implement the proposed blind BTC vault. Route-ticket signatures remain a separate dependency. |
| 1991 | Pedersen commitments [8], Confidential Transactions [9] and Bulletproofs [10]. | Background on hiding values while checking constraints. The deployed BLIND commitment and proof encodings are defined by its own pinned profiles; transparent amounts are public. |
| 2013–2014 | Zerocoin and Zerocash [11][4]. | Notes, commitments, nullifiers and proofs inform the design. They do not make Bitcoin funding or transaction timing invisible, or guarantee anonymity when few participants are active. |
| 2014 | Stealth addresses [12] and later silent payments [13]. | Background on private receipt of payments. Current bln1 addresses use BLIND's own note encoding; they are not Bitcoin silent-payment addresses. |
| 2016 | Mimblewimble [14][15]. | Research context only. Per-block mixing is not implemented: outputs remain visibly grouped in each BLIND transaction envelope. |
| 2016 | Single-use seals and client-side validation [16], including RGB [17]. | Related verification ideas. Bitcoin confirms the carrier history; BLIND-aware software separately verifies asset rules. This is not an implementation of RGB or a BTC vault. |
| 2017 | TumbleBit [18]. | Research on payment privacy. BLINDSATS does not claim that its services cannot correlate requests; routing and eligibility services remain part of its stated trust and availability boundary. |
| 2017 | Scriptless scripts [19]. | Possible swap research, not a deployed BLIND swap mechanism. |
| 2018–2023 | Statechains and blinded co-signing [20][21][22]. | Historical design context. BLIND notes are not statechain BTC and do not provide a redeemable BTC peg. |
| 2025 | Shielded CSV [23]. | Related research on private client-side validation. Its size and security claims must not be substituted for BLIND's deployed formats. |
| 2026 | Blinded statechain and Liquid swap experiments [24]. | Future research context only. The proposed BLIND note swap is not implemented. |
With thanks
- David Chaum, whose blind-signature research [1] helped establish privacy-preserving electronic cash.
- Duncan Townsend, whose Blind Bitcoin Transfers at blindbitcoin.com (2011) [2] was one of the first attempts to bring Chaum's blind signatures to Bitcoin.
- Adam Suhl, Danny Ben-David and Peter Schmidt-Nielsen, whose Dryer21 (MIT, 2014) [3] revisited anonymous Bitcoin with blind signatures, and credited Townsend's earlier service as its inspiration.
- Peter Shor, whose 1994 algorithm [25] showed that a large enough quantum computer could compute discrete logarithms, the kind of problem that guards Bitcoin keys [26]. The current BLIND implementation does not claim post-quantum security.
A non-profit project
BLINDSATS is run as a non-profit project. It is not incorporated as a charity and holds no tax-exempt status, so non-profit here is a commitment, on these terms:
- No profit to contributors. No part of the project's funds is paid to contributors as profit, dividends or a share of the mint.
- Funds are accounted for. What the mint raises goes to the protocol, and how it is used is published.
As our reference for conduct we use two widely used US standards. Independent Sector's Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice [27] sets out 33 principles in four areas: legal compliance and public disclosure, effective governance, strong financial oversight, and responsible fundraising. The BBB Wise Giving Alliance's Standards for Charity Accountability [28] sets 20 standards for governance and oversight, measuring effectiveness, finances, and solicitations and informational materials.
Both are written for registered charities with a board, which BLINDSATS is not. We use them as a voluntary checklist, not as a claim of compliance, and follow the parts that fit a project like ours: accurate, honest materials, and a public account of how funds are used. BLINDSATS is not BBB accredited and has not been reviewed by either organization.
Organizations we admire
BLINDSATS builds on decades of public research and open-source work. These organizations carry much of it, and we recommend them to anyone who wants to support Bitcoin, cryptography and privacy.
- MIT Digital Currency Initiative, at the MIT Media Lab since 2015: research on the security, scalability and privacy of digital currency, and long-term funding for Bitcoin Core developers.
- Cryptography and Information Security Group, MIT CSAIL, founded in 1995 by Shafi Goldwasser, Silvio Micali and Ronald Rivest: cryptography from theory and proofs to protocols and systems.
- IEEE Information Theory Society, home of the Claude E. Shannon Award, first given to Shannon himself in 1973. His 1949 paper on secrecy systems [29] put cryptography on a mathematical footing.
- International Association for Cryptologic Research, a non-profit scientific organization that runs the Crypto, Eurocrypt and Asiacrypt conferences and publishes the Journal of Cryptology.
- Electronic Frontier Foundation, a US 501(c)(3) non-profit defending privacy and free expression online through law, policy and technology.
- The Tor Project, a US 501(c)(3) non-profit building free, open-source anonymity software, including Tor Browser.
- OpenSats, a US 501(c)(3) public charity funding developers of Bitcoin and other free, open-source software.
- Brink, a US 501(c)(3) non-profit that funds, educates and mentors Bitcoin protocol developers.
BLINDSATS is not affiliated with, sponsored by or endorsed by any of these organizations. They are listed only in recognition of their work.
References
- [1]D. Chaum, "Blind signatures for untraceable payments," In Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Crypto 82, Plenum Press, pages 199-203, 1983.
- [2]D. Townsend, "Blind Bitcoin Transfers," bitcointalk.org, https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=12751.0, 2011.
- [3]A. Suhl, D. Ben-David, P. Schmidt-Nielsen, "Dryer21, a Bitcoin anonymizer service," MIT 6.858 Computer Systems Security final project, https://css.csail.mit.edu/6.858/2014/projects/asuhl-dannybd-snp.pdf, 2014.
- [4]E. Ben-Sasson, A. Chiesa, C. Garman, M. Green, I. Miers, E. Tromer, M. Virza, "Zerocash: Decentralized anonymous payments from Bitcoin," In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 459-474, 2014.
- [5]D. Hopwood, S. Bowe, T. Hornby, N. Wilcox, "Zcash protocol specification," https://zips.z.cash/protocol/protocol.pdf, 2016.
- [6]P. Wuille, J. Nick, A. Towns, "Taproot: SegWit version 1 spending rules," BIP 341, https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0341.mediawiki, 2020.
- [7]S. Nakamoto, "Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system," https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf, 2008.
- [8]T.P. Pedersen, "Non-interactive and information-theoretic secure verifiable secret sharing," In Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO '91, LNCS vol 576, pages 129-140, 1992.
- [9]G. Maxwell, "Confidential transactions," https://elementsproject.org/features/confidential-transactions/investigation, 2015.
- [10]B. Bünz, J. Bootle, D. Boneh, A. Poelstra, P. Wuille, G. Maxwell, "Bulletproofs: Short proofs for confidential transactions and more," In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 315-334, 2018.
- [11]I. Miers, C. Garman, M. Green, A.D. Rubin, "Zerocoin: Anonymous distributed e-cash from Bitcoin," In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 397-411, 2013.
- [12]P. Todd, "Stealth addresses," bitcoin-development mailing list, https://gnusha.org/pi/bitcoindev/20140106120338.GA14918@savin/, 2014.
- [13]josibake, R. Somsen, S. Falbesoner, "Silent payments," BIP 352, https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0352.mediawiki, 2023.
- [14]T.E. Jedusor, "Mimblewimble," https://scalingbitcoin.org/papers/mimblewimble.txt, 2016.
- [15]A. Poelstra, "Mimblewimble," https://scalingbitcoin.org/papers/mimblewimble.pdf, 2016.
- [16]P. Todd, "Preventing consensus fraud with commitments and single-use-seals," https://petertodd.org/2016/commitments-and-single-use-seals, 2016.
- [17]M. Orlovsky, "RGB I.0: Scalable consensus for client-side validated smart contracts," Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2025/1400, https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/1400, 2025.
- [18]E. Heilman, L. Alshenibr, F. Baldimtsi, A. Scafuro, S. Goldberg, "TumbleBit: An untrusted Bitcoin-compatible anonymous payment hub," In Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS), 2017.
- [19]A. Poelstra, "Scriptless scripts," MIT Bitcoin Expo, https://download.wpsoftware.net/bitcoin/wizardry/mw-slides/2017-03-mit-bitcoin-expo/slides.pdf, 2017.
- [20]R. Somsen, "Statechains: Off-chain transfer of UTXOs," Scaling Bitcoin Tokyo, https://scalingbitcoin.org/transcript/tokyo2018/statechains, 2018.
- [21]R. Somsen, "Statechains: Non-custodial off-chain Bitcoin transfer," https://medium.com/@RubenSomsen/statechains-non-custodial-off-chain-bitcoin-transfer-1ae4845a4a39, 2019.
- [22]T. Trevethan, "Blinded 2-party Musig2," bitcoin-dev mailing list, https://gnusha.org/pi/bitcoindev/CAJvkSsc_rKneeVrLkTqXJDKcr+VQNBHVJyXVe=7PkkTZ+SruFQ@mail.gmail.com/, 2023.
- [23]J. Nick, L. Eagen, R. Linus, "Shielded CSV: Private and efficient client-side validation," Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2025/068, https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/068, 2025.
- [24]stutxo (lxdev), "Blinded bitcoin <> Liquid USDT swaps," thread on X, https://x.com/stutxo/status/2082487825392455688, 2026.
- [25]P.W. Shor, "Algorithms for quantum computation: discrete logarithms and factoring," In Proceedings 35th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, IEEE Computer Society Press, pages 124-134, 1994.
- [26]J. Proos, C. Zalka, "Shor's discrete logarithm quantum algorithm for elliptic curves," In Quantum Information and Computation, vol 3, no 4, pages 317-344, 2003.
- [27]Independent Sector, "Principles for Good Governance and Ethical Practice: A Guide for Charities and Foundations," 2015 edition, https://independentsector.org/research/principles-for-good-governance/.
- [28]BBB Wise Giving Alliance, "BBB Standards for Charity Accountability," 2003, https://give.org/bbb-standards-for-charity-accountability.
- [29]C.E. Shannon, "Communication theory of secrecy systems," Bell System Technical Journal, vol. 28, no. 4, pages 656-715, 1949.
Blindsats